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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will explore the impact of Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) on the arbitrator's resolution of workplace grievances.
The principal question is whether arbitrators should develop new standards
for use in AIDS related cases. The short answer is no. The traditional
standards developed for analogous non-AIDS related disputes will serve
the arbitrator equally well in an AIDS case. The most basic advice is
appropriate here: "if it isn't broken, don't fix it."
A study of the AIDS epidemic from a scientific perspective does not
seem to reveal any unique workplace issues. AIDS is a blood borne fatal
disease' which health authorities maintain is extremely difficult to contract
in the normal employment setting. In a workplace where employees or
customers are not exposed to the blood or bodily fluids of infected
workers, AIDS seems little different than ailments such as cancer,
diabetes or heart disease. These conditions which may also be fatal to the
"infected" worker, can cause debilitation and thus raise safety concerns;
but they pose no direct threat of infection to others. Where exposure to
bodily fluids is present in the workplace, AIDS seems little different than
other infectious diseases which pose a threat to co-worker safety.
What seems to separate AIDS from all other medical conditions is its
complex social and political baggage. The popular perceptions
surrounding AIDS often overshadow the purely factual issues. As a
consequence, there are calls for an "AIDS approach" to medical research,
a "new" approval process for experimental drugs and "fundamental
premises" unique to the arbitration of AIDS related employment disputes.3
Proponents argue that the infectious nature of AIDS coupled with its fatal
course make it a unique and unparalleled social problem. However, at
least in the arbitration arena, the tools at hand are more than adequate to
resolve AIDS related controversies.
An extensive examination of society's response to the AIDS epidemic
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1. See discussion infra part III.
2. For purposes of this discussion, a "normal" work setting is one where employees
and customers do not come into contact with the bodily fluids of others. In work settings
where such contact is common, (legalized prostitution, health care and emergency services),
the risk of contracting AIDS can be extremely high. See infra Appendix B for a list of
articles discussing AIDS issues in the health care context.
3. See infra note 100.
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is beyond the scope of this Article. However, in a case involving AIDS,
the arbitrator can expect the parties to brief him or her on the "facts"
surrounding the disease.4 Given the complexity of the scientific evidence
and the divergence of opposing views, an arbitrator who wants to make an
intelligent, factual decision needs to have a basic understanding of the
historical and scientific issues which can shape an AIDS related dispute.
Though this is ostensibly an Article concerning arbitration, the initial
discussion is devoted to basic background material on AIDS. While this
material could have been relegated to an appendix, an understanding of
the basic facts5 concerning AIDS is essential to the later discussion. The
discussion is divided into five sub-topics: the social history of AIDS; the
medical facts most relevant to AIDS workplace issues; the arbitrator's
role; the possible sources of external law and public policy; and, finally,
common AIDS related workplace issues with suggested solutions under
each arbitration model.
II. AIDS: A BRIEF HISTORICAL EXAMINATION
In 1979 a physician at New York University Hospital treated two
young men in succession for a rare skin cancer which normally attacked
elderly men of Mediterranean origin.6 The doctor noted that both men
were homosexual but drew no conclusion from that fact. On June 5,
1981, the Federal Center for Disease Control (CDC) first reported its
analysis of a previously unidentified condition. This condition, which had
apparently destroyed the immune systems of five healthy homosexual
men, was later identified as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, or
"AIDS". s
To date, the primary "high risk" groups in the United States have been
4. Arbitrators are being increasingly called upon to make decisions where the parties'
contractual obligations turn on medical evidence. Th'e arbitrator's ignorance of medicine and
the medical facts upon which a particular case may turn can constitbte a serious impediment
to the decision making process. See Arnold M. Zack & Norma W. Zack, Arbitrators and
Medical Evidence, 39 ARB. J., (Sept. 1984, at 6). Andrea Wilson, Medical Eidence in
Arbitration: Aspects and Dilemmas, 39 ARB. J. Sept., 1984, at 11.
5. As in many areas of endeavor, what passes for "facts" are those things agreed
upon by a majority of scientists working in the field. While a majority of scientific opinion
does not ensure a "fact" is "reality," it is the best that one can do at any given moment.
6. The cancer, Kaposi's sarcoma, frequently afflicts AIDS patients. See infra note
32.
7. Thomas R. Mendicino, Note, Characterization and Disease: Homosexuals and the
Threat of Aids, 66 N.C. L. REv. 226, 230 (1987).
8. Jana Howard Carey & Megan M. Arthur, The Developing Law on AIDS in the
Workplace, 46 MD. L. REv. 284, 284 (1987).
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homosexual and bisexual males, 9 male and female intravenous drug
abusers,"' male and female Haitians," and recipients of blood products.'
Though the spread of AIDS outside these groups has been limited,' fear
engendered by 'the devastating nature of the disease brought unresolved
social issues relating to these groups to the surface.
14
Some segments of s6ciety have taken the position that infected
members of high risk groups are only reaping what they have sown by
their own behavior." There has been a resurgence of anti-homosexual
rhetoric more reminiscent of revival tent meetings than political
discourse. 6  Hunting for, and apparently finding, homosexuals under
9. Researchers firmly established the link between the incidence of AIDS and
homosexual activity early in 1982. Although the Center for Disease Control initially used the
terms Kaposi's sarcoma and PCP, (the two rare conditions whose increased frequency had
alerted the scientific community), the perception of the disease's relationship to homosexual
activity was reflected by popular usage of the acronym GRID-Gay-Related Immune
Deficiency. Mendicino, supra note 7. at 230-3 1.
10. Id.
11.
In 1982, researchers first identified recent Haitian immigrants to the United
States as a high risk group for AIDS. An immediate controversy accusing the
CDC of racial and socio-economic bias surrounded the classification of an
entire nationality as a risk group. However, the lack of any identifiable
behavioral characteristics precluded inclusion of many of the Haitian cases in
any of the existing risk categories. Haitian authorities asserted that there was
no scientific basis to classify a nationality as being at risk for AIDS. The
CDC prevailed by arguing that proper epidemiological evaluation required the
creation of the category because the empirical subjects denied participating in
any previously classified risk behavior while the incidence of AIDS cases per
population unit was much higher in the American Haitian community than in
the population of the United States as a whole.
Mendicino, supra note .7, at 232 (footnotes omitted).
12. Id. at 231.
13. See Stephen Margolis, The AIDS Epidemic:. Reality Versus Myth, 72 JUDICATURE
58, 59 (1988).
14. One commentator has attempted to explain the widespread social "panic response"
to AIDS as a function of five social taboos. The writer believes it is the fear implicit in
societal taboos relating to sex, social stigma, helplessness, mental illness and death which
inhibits society's ability to deal effectively with AIDS. David I. Shulman, AIDS
Discrimination: Its Nature, Meaning and Function, 12 NOVA L. REv. 1113, 1115-17 (1988).
15. Representative Dornan of California makes it clear that he is convinced the
majority of AIDS infected people have no one but themselves to blame for their illness and
that these "homosexuals" have shown their inherent immorality by joining the pro-abortion
movement to secure fetal tissue for AIDS research. 135 CONG. REC. H2029-01 (daily ed.
May 3, 1990) (statement by Rep. Dornan).
16.
[O]n May 1, 1987, an aide to Reverend Jerry Falwell 'disclosed that the
Moral Majority was going to purchase broadcasting time to "expose the
myths and the cover-up of the facts about the AIDS epidemic." In a related
letter, Reverend Falwell attributed the "original spawn" of the AIDS epidemic
to homosexuals and alleged that "powerfuil militant homosexuals'" have
extended their "wretched [political] influence" to extract a "cover-up" about
the disease and to prohibit public health officials from "doing what needs to
be done" - mandatory testing and quarantine - to halt the spread of the rgay
plague."
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every bed, one elected official even characterized the recently passed
Americans With Disabilities Act as a "last ditch attempt of the
remorseless sodomy lobby to achieve its national agenda before the
impending decimation of AIDS destroys its political clout."17
Other high risk groups have fared little better than members of the
homosexual community. Some commentators have argued that the impact
of poverty and minority status on the "America" one perceives is nowhere
more obvious than in the cases of people with AIDS. The focus of most
early organized education campaigns was on the predominantly white
middle class homosexual community, ignoring the. ravages of the disease
in minority communities. 9 The continued spread of AIDS in minority
communities may reflect a reluctance to confront the underlying
behavioral patterns which promote the spread of the disease rather than
any societal bias.2 However, whatever the cause of the epidemic in their
communities, minority group members have tended to suffer more and die
faster than their white, middle class counterparts.2 1
Mendicino, supra note 7, at 238.
17. 135 CONG. REc. H6440-01 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1989) (statement of Rep. Burton).
18.
[Tlhe city of San Francisco lost almost $3 million in state funds and private
grants because of a lack of minority involvement in its AIDS education
planning. The San Francisco experience is not unique.
The Chicago Department of Public Health has been criticized for neglecting
Hispanics. The ACLU and a coalition of minority organizations have filed a
lawsuit against Los Angeles County for failing to provide minority AIDS
education. So, too, the Philadelphia AIDS Task Force has been publicly
criticized for not networking outside its white gay base. AIDS
Foundation/Houston has been attacked for racist fund raising activities.
Eugene M. Harrington, A Fatal Bias: AIDS and Minorities, 14 HuM. RTS. 34, 37 (1987)
(published by the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, American Bar
Association).
19. See id.
20.
The original assumption that AIDS was a gay disease forced denial in many
segments of the minority communities. Thus, just recently when AIDS
experts asked to speak to churches in the San Francisco Baptist Ministers
Conference, a group representing predominantly black congregations, their
request was denied.
The acceptance of AIDS, in effect, means accepting drug abuse, prostitution,
homosexuality and bisexuality in the black and Hispanic communities. Thus,
societies that are stigmatized because of racism must accept the existence of a
disease whose transmittal embraces conduct usually unacceptable at best and
illegal at worst.
Harrington, supra note 18, at 36.
21.
The average life expectancy for a minority PWA [people with AIDS] is 19
weeks; for a white PWA it is two years .... Black and Hispanic PWAs have
less access to adequate health care, their nutrition is more unbalanced, their
health insurance is less effective or non-existent, and the ability to perceive
themselves at-risk and thus protect themselves and their partners are
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The possible re-emergence of race and other anti-minority group
prejudices in the context of the AIDS debate presents difficult questions
for an arbitrator. Is the terminated or disciplined employee being singled
out simply because he/she has been exposed to the AIDS virus or for
engaging in high risk activity? Has the adverse action been taken
because the employer (and other employees) believe the exposed employee
poses a real health danger or simply because the exposed employee
belongs to a sub-group whose members are otherwise traditionally
prejudiced against? What will be the impact on the labor relations system
if the employer and other employees are permitted to use the risk of AIDS
exposure as a rationale for discriminating against members of a despised
sub-group? Finally, is it the arbitrator's job to peer under the surface of
the grievance to see if discriminatory motives lie at the heart of the
adverse action?" While these "social" issues can be ignored, their
implicit resolution by an arbitrator will have legal and systemic
implications which may extend far beyond the given case.
III. AIDS: A BRIEF CLINICAL EXAMINATION
The Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the cause of AIDS,a is
obviously less. This, in turn, means that medical intervention comes much
later and is probably of a poorer quality.
Id. at 37.
22. One could argue that the grievant and his or her union are. free to assert that the
adverse action was in fact motivated by impermissible prejudice against the grievant's racial
or ethnic subgroup or the grievant's sexual orientation. Similar assertions are common
under Title VII and could be resolved in the same manner as allegations of "pretext" in Title
VII cases. See generally BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN. EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAw, 597-603 (2d ed. 1983). One could also argue that the traditional
analysis used in "mixed motive" cases might be appropriate here. However, there seems
little place for these approaches in the arbitration of an AIDS dispute. Allegations of pretext
or mixed motive are possible only when the employer seeks to take adverse action based on
conjecture or generalizations. The arbitrator who requires the employer to establish that the
adverse action was predicated on the established consequences of the particular grievant's
own AIDS related medical condition can base his or her decision on that evidence without
fear of "hidden motivations." The key will be whether the arbitrator knows enough about
AIDS to distinguish between conjecture and medical "fact."
23.
The cause of AIDS derives from a member of a family of viruses known as
retroviruses. Such viruses are prevalent in certain species of animals, but
have only recently been described in human beings. In 1983, a previously
unknown retrovirus later named as LAV (lymphadenopathy-associated virus),
HTLV-111 (human T-cell lymphotropic virus type III), or ARV
(AIDS-associated retrovirus), was identified as the cause of AIDS. These
early isolates of retroviruses were later recognized to be closely related; and a
single name, Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), was proposed for them
and for subsequently isolated and related viruses. (footnotes omitted)
Rosalind M. Kendellen, Aids: A Clinical Statement, 126 N.J. LAW. 14 (1989).
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now estimated to infect up to two million people in the United States and
millions more in other countries. 24 It has been estimated that 365,000 new
AIDS cases will have been reported in the United States by 1992.2 The
virus is thought to be transmitted by intimate sexual contact, the sharing
of contaminated needles, or, less commonly, by percutaneous inoculation
with infectious blood or blood products.2  While AIDS is thus
communicable, there is apparently no evidence that AIDS can be
transmitted by casual contact7 or, as has been suggested by some,'s by
blood sucking insects.'
There is to date no effective treatment for the underlying acquired
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. C. EVERETT KooP, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH HUM. SERVICES, THE SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 5, 19-20 (1986).
27.
Although HIV has been occasionally found in the tears and in saliva of
infected individuals, the concentration and amount of virus, its viability, the
lack of effective transmission and the lack of any reported cases of
transmission by these means, all negate the importance of these fluids in the
course of the AIDS epidemic. The fear of casual contact-handshaking, food
preparation and handling and the normal interactions of the workplace-has
become a significant issue. There have been nine scientific studies which
completely discount the role of casual and normal human interaction as a
means of HIV transmission. In addition, there have not been any "casual
contact" cases reported among the relatives and friends of the 60,000 reported
AIDS cases.
Margolis, supra note 13, at 61 (footnote omitted).
28. Consider the comments Representative Burton of Indiana made on the floor of the
U.S. House of Representatives on Thursday June 9, 1988. Rep. Burton sharply criticized
the position of the Surgeon General that AIDS was not transmitted by insects and demanded
a mandatory nationwide AIDS testing program to identify and track infected individuals.
29.
Mosquitoes have been discounted as agents for HIV transmission to humans.
Belle Glade, Florida, a small town approximately 40 miles west of West Palm
Beach, had the highest incidence in the United States of reported AIDS, 564
per 100,000 population. A series of medical and epidemiological studies
were initiated involving more than a thousand people residing in Belle Glade,
which showed that only black residents of Belle Glade and persons born in
Haiti demonstrated antibodies to the AIDS virus, in a ratio of 1.3 to 1, male
to female. No children, or adults above the age of 60 were found to be
seropositive for the AIDS virus antibody. The comprehensive study
demonstrated a localization of HIV infection in tightly defined neighborhoods,
specifically among the squalid living conditions of the black residents of Belle
Glade, many of whom were employed as migrant farm workers. HIV
infection was shown to be associated with sexually active lifestyles,
prostitution and/or being born in Haiti, where heterosexual transmission of
the virus has been demonstrated. Among men specifically, infection was
associated with homosexual activity and intravenous drug abuse.
Margolis, supra note 13, at 61-62.
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immune deficiency. 30 As a consequence, most AIDS patients die from
overwhelming infections within two to three years of the initial appearance
of symptoms. In fact, the principal manifestations of AIDS can be either
an opportunistic infectio 3t or cancers such as Kaposi's sarcoma. 32
In addition to these infections and malignancies, there is evidence that
the vast majority of adult AIDS patients suffer damage to the noncentral
nervous system or AIDS related dementia.' This data suggests that the
range of AIDS related neurologic and neuropsychiatric impairment may
extend beyond that of AIDS itself.s4 Even more disturbing is evidence
30.
Since HIV appears to cause persistent lifelong infection, it must be
approached as a member of a class of viruses for which successful treatment
may be most difficult to find. In general, infectious viral agents remain a
major health threat. Yet, they are difficult to treat because they are
intracellular pathogens, replicating within the cells of their chosen host, and
thus they compromise the activities and health of the host cells. As a
member of the family of retroviruses, HIV represents a type of viral pathogen
whose therapy has not been previously researched in humans.
Kendellen, supra note 23, at 16.
31.
There is a typical grouping of clinical infectious syndromes and opportunistic
infections in AIDS patients. Many AIDS patients experience malaise, fevers,
anorexia, and weight loss for weeks, months,* or years prior to the
documentation of their initial opportunistic infection. These symptoms are
nonspecific. AIDS patients may initially develop localized dermatomal herpes
zoster (shingles) or oral candidiasis (thrush). Extension of oral candidiasis can
lead to esophageal erosions, complaints of difficulty in swallowing, and a
burning sensation behind the sternum. Both primary and recurrent Herpes
simplex virus infections appear as painful vesicular lesions in oral, genital,
and perineal areas.
ABE M. MACHER, in I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ACQUIRED IMMUNE
DEFICIENCY SYNDROME (6th ed. 1987).
32.
Kaposi's sarcoma is a vascular tumor of endothelial cell origin and appears as
firm red or violet nodules involving the skin and mucous membranes; lesions
are often multiple and may involve any portion of the skin or any mucous
membrane; body surfaces may eventually be covered by these multifocal
tumors. Some patients develop life-threatening visceral involvement due to
massive tumor infiltration of the lung or gastrointestinal tract; since they are
vascular tumors, bleeding is not uncommon.
Id. See also Alvin E. Friedman-Kien ET AL., Disseminated Kaposi's sarcoma in homosexual
men, 96 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 693-700 (1982).
33.
As many as 90 percent of patients dying from HIV-related conditions have
abnormalities of the nervous system at postmortem examination; the majority
of patients have some clinical manifestation of neurologic disease during their
lifetime. Of the HIV-related neurologic complications, dementia is among the
most severe and disabling.
Kendellen, supra note 23, at 15 (footnote omitted).
34.
It has been estimated that between 30 percent and 60 percent of AIDS
patients will manifest a characteristic dementia syndrome, which has been
designated AIDS dementia complex (ADC); that 10 percent of patients may
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that central nervous system involvement by the HIV virus may begin early
in the course of infection and cause mild cognitive defects in seropositive
individuals who exhibit no other outward signs of disease.'
For the purpose of analysis it is useful to separate those who have
been exposed to AIDS36 into three groups. First, there are those who test
positive for exposure to the virus but show no clinical manifestations of
the disease.37 These people may never develop AIDS Related Complex
present with neurological symptoms before developing any signs of AIDS;
and that perhaps an even larger number of infected individuals may show
persistent evidence of neurologic impairment in the absence of an actual
diagnosis of AIDS. The AIDS dementia complex . . . is often marked by
initially subtle cognitive or behavioral dysfunction occurring over weeks to
months. Patients initially report memory loss, difficulty in concentrating,
social withdrawal, and lethargy. Those early signs may often be attributed to
depression and may be ignored until they eventually progress to more
dramatic deficits involving severe dementia and psychomotor retardation.
Nicholas Hentoff, Note, The Rehabilitation Act's Otherwise Qualified Requirement and the
Aids Vits: Protecting the Public fron Aids-Related Health and Safety Hazards. 30 ARIZ.
L. REV. 571, 620 (1988) (quoting Selwyn, AIDS. What is Known. III Clinical Aspects, 21
HOSPITAL PRACTICE 123-24 (1986)) (emphasis omitted).
35. Id.
36.
The earliest indications that HIV has been transmitted to an individual are
either the isolation of HIV from that person or the detection of antibodies to
the virus in the person's blood. The new appearance of antibodies, known as
seroconversion, appears to predate any detectable immunologic defects (i.e.,
decrease in the number of T4 cells); but within five years of seroconversion
evidence of immunologic defects occurs in more than 90 percent of
individuals. Six to eight weeks is the typical time 'between transmission of
the virus and seroconversion. In some reported instances, individuals have
remained seronegative for many months, although they were infected as
evidenced by cultivation of the virus in the blood. A very high proportion of
individuals who are seropositive for HIV antibodies will ultimately develop
AIDS.
Kendellen, supra note 23, at 15 (footnotes omitted).
37.
A person infected with the AIDS virus will be detectable through testing for
the production of antibodies to the human immunodeficiency virus in 6 to 12
weeks from the time of infection. A very small percentage of HIV-infected
people have been reported to have their antibodies not measurable for as long
as 12 months from the time of infection.
The HIV-infected person may or may not progress to ARC and/or AIDS.
Approximately 30-50 per cent of homosexual/bisexual men infected with HIV
have been diagnosed with AIDS. The incubation period (the time from
infection with the virus to the diagnosis of AIDS) has been shown to vary
significantly. The mean time has been reported for transfusion recipients to
be as short as 2 years, for children (0-5 years of age). 5.5 years. for elderly
patients (60 years and older) and for adults (5-59 years of age), 8.23 years.
Preliminary results are demonstrating shorter incubation periods for male
intravenous drug abusers and even shorter incubation times for infected
females.
Margolis, supra note 13, at 60-61 (footnotes omitted).
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(ARC) or AIDS, but can pass the infection to others.3 s Second, there are
HIV infected people who suffer from physical symptoms related to AIDS
but have not experienced the severe medical complications which
characterize AIDS. These patients, suffering from what is now called
ARC,39 begin to experience loss of appetite, weight loss, fever, night
sweats, skin rashes, diarrhea, tiredness, lack of resistance to infection, or
swollen lymph nodes." Lastly, some patients who have AIDS suffer from
a severe degradation of the body's immune system which renders the
patient vulnerable to infection by bacteria, protozoa, fungi, and other
viruses or malignancies. These infections, which may lead to such
life-thieatening illnesses as pneumonia, meningitis, and cancer, are 'the
cause of death for most AIDS patients."
As a practical matter, arbitrators are more likely to face cases
involving employees suffering from ARC and AIDS, rather than those
who are infected but asymptomatic. 'Setting aside the possibility of AIDS
Related Dementia, persons who are seropositive for the AIDS antibody
but are experiencing no physical signs of disease will for the most part be
indistinguishable from the larger employee group. While adverse actions
based on mere seropositivity are possible, given the position of public
health authorities, justification for such actions will be extremely hard for
the employer to articulate.
IV. THE ROLE OF THE ARBITRATOR
The comments thai follow are intended as a brief outline of the
relevant principles governing the conduct of arbitration in the private labor
relations context. As such, they present the basic picture without which
the substantive discussion concerning the impact of AIDS on that process
would not be possible. However, lengthy discussions of philosophically
38.
Even though the person infected with HIV may not be aware of that fact,
either because of not being tested or not yet having measurable antibodies,
they can transmit the virus. In fact, the person infected with the AIDS virus,
the person who is analyzed as HIV-antibody positive, the person with ARC
and the person with AIDS can all transmit the virus via their blood, semen
and/or vaginal discharges throughout their lifetime.
Id. at 60.
39. It is unclear whether persons with ARC will invariably develop AIDS, but the
evidence seems to indicate that this may be so. Id.
40. KOOP, supra note 26. For a more technical definition of ARC, see Robert R.
Redfield, ET AL., Heterosexually Acquired HTLV-Ill/LAV Disease (AIDS-Related Complex
and AIDS), 254 J.A.M.A. 2094 (Oct. 18, 1985). See also Janine M. Jason, et al.,
HTLV-IHI/LAV Antibody and Immune Status of Household Contacts and Sexual Partners of
Persons With Hemophilia, 255 J.A.M.A. 212 (Jan. 10, 1986).
41. KOOP, supra note 26, at 11-12.
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"hot" topics, such as the propriety of applying external law to the arbitral
process42 or the appropriate limits of the public policy exception," are
beyond the scope of this paper.
Contractual dispute resolution in the United States private labor
relations model normally encompasses at least three elements. First,
within their collective bargaining agreement, the contracting parties,
employer and union, establish a grievance procedure where disagreements
concerning the terms of that agreement are sent for resolution." Next,
when a grievance arises under the terms of the contract, the parties
process the disagreement through the basic grievance machinery and
attempt to resolve it to their mutual satisfaction. 4 Lastly, if the parties
are unable to agree on a "correct" resolution of the dispute and the topic
is one which the parties have agreed will be subject to arbitration, then
the dispute can be submitted to a neutral party6 who will interpret the
contractual language for the parties and render a decision.
Arbitration plays a unique role in the process just described. In
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,4 the
United States Supreme Court set the stage for the current system of
dispute resolution by defining a forum for the enforcement of the
provisions of collective bargaining agreements. In the so-called Steel
Workers Trilogy, 40 the court recognized the central position of the
arbitration process within the labor relations model by severely limiting
42. See generally Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator, ihe NLRB, and the Courts, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ANNUAL MEETING 67 (Nat'l Acad. of Arbitrators, BNA Books,
1967); Richard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN
AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST ANNUAL MEETING 42 (Nat'l Acad.
of Arbitrators, BNA Books, 1968).
43. See generally Mary A. Bedikian, Riding on the Horns of a Dilemma: The Law of
Contract v. Public Policy in the Enforcement of Labor Arbitral Awards, 1988 DET. C.L.
REV. 693; Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash
Between the Public Policy Erception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3
(1989); Timothy J. Heinsz, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Enterprise
Wheel Goes Around and Around, 52 Mo. L. REV. 243 (1987); Amanda J. Berlowe,
Comment, Judicial Deference to Grievance Arbitration in the Private Sector: Saving Grace
in the Search for a Well-Defined Public Policy Erception, 42 U. MIAMI L.REv. 767 (1988);
James M. Magee, Note, The Public Policy Exception to Judicial Deferral of Labor
Arbitration Awards - How Far Should Erpansion Go?, 39 S.C. L. REV. 465 (1988).
44. In the federal sector the opportunity for binding arbitration is required to be in
every collective bargaining agreement. See 5 U.S.C. § 7121(b)(3)(C) (1988).
45. Douglas E. Ray, Protecting the Parties' Bargain After Misco: Court Review of
Labor Arbitration Awards, 64 IND. L.J. 1, 2 n.2 (1988).
46. This fact finder can be an independent arbitrator hired to hear a particular
controversy, an arbitrator who has been hired to hear all the disputes which arise under the
agreement, or a multi-person panel made up of representatives of each party and an outside
arbitrator.
47. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
48. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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the scope of judicial review of arbitral decisions.'
The Supreme Court's treatment of arbitration reflected the Court's
view of the parties' contractual relationship and the importance, of the
collective bargaining agreement to the maintenance of labor peace'.s  The
labor relations environment is characterized by extensive daily interaction
between the contracting parties. The level and nature of this interaction
may be shaped as much by the political and economic strengths of the
parties as it is by their purely legal rights under the contract. In addition,
whatever their disagreements may be, the parties to these contracts are
bound in a relationship whose continuing nature, imposed- by law, is quite
different from that created by other contracts. s The resolution of these
disagreements by arbitration is intended to obviate the need to resort to
the traditional but more disruptive dispute resolution weapons:
slowdowns, strikes, lockouts and litigation!'
Arbitration can be viewed purely as a contractual enforcement
mechanism. By contracting for binding arbitration, the parties have
decided to have an arbitrator act as "contract reader." s3 The arbitrator's
function is to tell the parties what a fair interpretation of their agreement
mandates in a particular case. As discussed at length below, that opinion,
49. The Trilogy cases stand for three basic propositions which have elevated labor
arbitration to the central position it now enjoys: (1) judicial review is limited to whether a
particular 'grievance is arbitrable; (2) there is a presumption that a dispute between the
parties concerning their rights under the contract is arbitrable; and (3) an arbitrator's award
must draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. Bedikian, supra note 43, at
699.
50.
In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Here
arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife. Since arbitration of labor
disputes has quite different functions from arbitration under an ordinary
commercial agreement, the hostility evinced by courts toward arbitration of
commercial agreements has no place here. .For arbitration of labor disputes
under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the collective
bargaining process itself.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
51. Note the Supreme Court's language in John Wiley & Sons,'Inc. v. Livingston,
376 U.S. 543, 550 (1969):
While the principle of law governing ordinary contracts would not bind to a
contract an unconsenting successor to a contracting party, a collective
bargaining agreement is not an ordinary contract . . . The collective
agreement covers the whole employment relationship. It calls into being -a
new common law . . . It is not in any real sense the simple product of a
consensual relationship.
52. In United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960),
Justice Douglas noted the policy preference for the use of arbitration in § 203(d) of The
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement."'
53. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second
Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1137, 1160-61 (1977).
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to be valid, must "draw its essence"' from the contractual terms to which
the parties have agreed. ss Similarly, when one of the parties seeks court
enforcement of an arbitral award, the court's role should be to ensure the
parties have received the benefit of their bargain,-" and not whether, in the
court's opinion, some abstract notion of industrial justice has been
achieved. Unfortunately, result-oriented interpretations of the substance
and "penumbra" of collective bargaining agreements can and do provide
fertile ground for both arbitral and judicial mischief.
The arbitration community has wrestled for decades with the "correct"
placement of arbitral parameters. Two primary schools of thought have
developed with a somewhat indecisive middle group encamped between
the two.s One school has argued for a "four corners" approach to
contract interpretation. The second has urged the application of external
law to contract interpretation. The middle group would permit the
application of external law when "required" to understand the parties'
contractual dispute.
Under the four corners model, the arbitrator looks for the answer to
the dispute t within the four corners of the parties' agreement without
recourse to external laws or standards not explicitly incorporated by
reference" or otherwise submitted for consideration by the parties.' The
54. In the third Trilogy case, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960) the Supreme Court noted the contractual basis for the arbitrator's
power:
When an arbitrator is commissioned to interpret and apply the collective
bargaining agreement, he is to bring his informed judgment to bear in order
to reach a fair solution of a problem . . . . Nevertheless, an arbitrator is
confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining
agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He
may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is
legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this
obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
55. Id.
56. See supra note 42.
57. See generally Bedikian, supra note 43.
58. For the purposes of this paper the words "he", "him", and "his" are intended to
be gender neutral, not a reflection that the arbitrator referred to is male.
59. One commentator has described four types of clauses which can be used by the
parties to incorporate external law. In the first, "global incorporation," the parties use
general language which obliges them to behave in accordance with the law. In the second,
"particular incorporation", the parties' clause brings specific statutes or laws within the
collective bargaining agreement. In the third and fourth types, "deleter" and "conformer"
clauses, the parties agree that clauses which conflict with external law shall either be deleted
(leaving the rest of the contract intact), or amended to conform with external law (leaving
the rest of the contract intact). See James Oldham, Arbitration and Relentless Legalization
in the Workplace, in ARBITRATION 1990 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON OLD ISSUES, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE FORTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS (Gladys
W. Gruenberg ed., Nat'l Acad. of Arbitrators), 1990.
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parties get the benefit of their bargain - no more, no less. Unfortunately,
while this model comports with a strictly contractual view of the labor
relations environment, it can result in arbitration awards that would violate
the dictates of external law. Some commentators view such a possibility
as an unacceptable weakness in the model. 6'
To the proponent of the "four corners" school of thought this
"problem" reflects 'the basic contractual' nature of a process in which
arbitration is simply one component. An award which is arguably
unenforceable as violative of external law gives the parties what they
contracted for: Simply put, the arbitrator's job is to tell the parties what
their agreement entitles them to claim and not to help them garner what
they failed to bargain for. If the parties' agreement does not entitle them
to an enforceable award, then they do not get one. Far from reflecting a
failure in the arbitral process, the arbitrator's award enhances the
collective bargaining relationship by showing the' parties that their
agreement contains an unenforceable provision which they may want to
address when the collective bargaining agreement is renegotiated.
The opposing camp urges the application of external law as the most
productive approach.' 2 Under this view, the arbitrator is employed to
assist the parties in the management of their collective bargaining
relationship. This school of arbitrators rejects the idea that an award
which simply forces the parties to engage in costly and protracted
litigation on the issue of enforceability could possibly be what the parties
bargained for. Proponents of the external law view argue further that all
contracts should be viewed as consistent with the regulatory environment
in which they were created. Therefore, recourse to external law is not
only permissible, it is essential to a "correct" reading of the parties'
bargain.'3  Finally, an enforceable award promotes "labor peace" by
resolving the issues between the parties without recourse to the courts.
It could be argued that the amendment labor contracts to incorporate
external law reflects a tendency towards paternalism which is completely
inappropriate in an ongoing contractual relationship. Like parents who
step in whenever their children have difficulties, an arbitrator who
incorporates external law removes the parties' incentive to learn from
their mistakes.- In the case of a collective bargaining agreement, the
parties need to learn to bargain more carefully over the terms of their
60. Richard Mittenthal, Why Arbitrators Do Not Apply Erternal Law, in LABOR
ARBITRATION, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR ADvOCATES 287 (Max Zimnay Er AL. eds., 1990).
61. Robert G. Howlett, Why Arbitrators Apply Erternal Law, in LABOR
ARBITRATION, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR AIJvOCATE 257 (Max Zimnay ET AL. eds., 1990).
62. Id.
63. This view of contracts was criticized by Professor Mittenthal as highly artificial in
that it assumes that everyone knows the law and everyone makes his contracts with reference
to that law. Mittenthal, supra note 60, at 287.
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relationship. In response, one might argue that this approach assumes that
the parties did not implicitly include applicable external law. If that
assumption is incorrect, then an arbitrator who applies external law is
giving the parties the benefit of their bargain and at the same time
preserving labor peace in the process.
Is the arbitrator's award really final? Regardless of the view taken as
to the application of external law, parties who receive arbitration awards
in which they disagree can and often do refuse to abide by them.64 The
"winning" party is then forced to sue for enforcement. When this
happens, the courts are injected into the labor relations process, a result
the parties were presumably trying to avoid by adopting arbitration in the
first place. Depending upon one's perspective, this judicial intrusion
either undercuts the labor relations model by compromising the virtues of
cheapness, swiftness and finality promised by arbitration, or enhances it,
and arbitration as a part of that model, by ensuring that arbitral awards
adhere to the larger societal interests which form the underpinnings of
lasting labor peace. Whatever the perspective, litigation of arbitral
awards is a reality which will not go away. What can the parties expect
of the judiciary?
The Supreme Court has severely restricted the judiciary's role in the
review of arbitral awards. However, there are two exceptions to the
principle of arbitral finality. The first exception, which is that the
arbitrator's award is fatally flawed because it does not draw "its essence"
from the collective bargaining agreement the parties asked him to
interpret, is a relatively narrow one. The basic rule seems simple. A
court is bound to enforce the award and is not entitled to review the
merits of the contract dispute unless the arbitrator's decision is not based
upon the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.' This rule applies
even when the basis for the arbitrator's decision may be ambiguous," or
even incorrect. So long as an arbitrator's decision arguably applied the
contract and can be viewed as within the scope of his authority, then the
fact that the court is convinced that the arbitrator committed serious
interpretive errors still does not permit the court to overturn the
arbitrator's decision.6
64. In addition to cases where finality is tested by a party's efforts to have the
arbitration award overturned, there are cases where the grievant is free to ignore the
arbitration decision and "re-litigate" the grievance as a violation of his or her independent
rights. The most common cases where these rights arise involve alleged Title VII violations.
See generally Michele Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, The Arbitration of Discrimination
Grievances in the Aftermath of Gardner-Denver, 39 ARB. J. (Sept. 1984, at 49).
65. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
66. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of Rubber Workers,
461 U.S. 757, 764 (1983).
67. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987).
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The parameters of the second exception, which is a court's traditional
power to refuse to enforce a contract that violates "public policy," are less
certain. In its decision in W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759,
International Union of Rubber Workers, the Supreme Court acknowledged
these inherent equitable powers:
If the contract as interpreted by the arbitrator violates some explicit
public policy, we are obliged to refrain from enforcing it. Such a
public policy, however, must be well defined and dominant, and is
to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and
not from general considerations of supposed public interests.'
In United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc.,69 the Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which had held
that an arbitration award reinstating a worker accused of drug use violated
public policy. The Court stated, "[w]e explicitly held in W. R. Grace
that a formulation of public policy based only on 'general considerations
of supposed public interests' is not the sort that permits a court to set
aside an arbitration award. "7 While this language narrows the scope of
potential judicial activism, the precise source of acceptable "public policy"
remains cloudy. However, it seems clear that, at a minimum, arbitration
'awards which require the parties to violate established law 'will be refused
enforcement by the courts.
V. SOURCES OF EXTERNAL LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
The preceding discussion above suggested that external law may shape
the benefit of the parties' bargain regardless of the model an arbitrator
chooses to follow. If the arbitrator believes review of external law is
required, then the award will be written to incorporate the principles and
direction therein.1 ' If the arbitrator is a proponent of the "four comers"
68. W. R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of Rubber Workers,
461 U.S. 757 (1983).
69. 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987).
70.' Id.
71. But see Roadmaster Corp. v. Prod. & Maintenance Employees' Local 504, 655
F. Supp. 1460, 1465 (S.D. 111. 1987), affld, 851 F.2d 886 (7th Cir. 1988), where the court
vacated part of an arbitration award because the arbitrator incorporated.§ 8(d) of the NLRA.
The arbitrator ruled against the employer citing its failure to offer to bargain with the union
prior to the contract's termination and, on that specific basis, ordered the contract extended
for a year. Quite understandably, the union supported the arbitrator's action urging that the
contract included all applicable law in existence at the time the contract was made. In the
absence of any contractual clauses incorporating external law or authorization for the
arbitrator to do so, the court refused to enforce the award. The Court held that the
arbitrator's decision was a reflection of his own views of the law rather than his opinion of
the proper interpretation of the contract. As such, it exceeded the jurisdiction granted by the
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rule, then the award may direct the parties to take action in violation of
external law. However, in the latter case, the losing party can be
expected to challenge the award on the ground that it contravenes public
policy."2 The challenging party will argue that the award should be
refused judicial enforcement because it directs a violation of established
law. Therefore, those inclined to contingency planning should identify
potential sources of established law which may be used to attack an award
if it "goes to the other side."
Given this reality, it is important to review briefly the possible
sources of external law or public policy which may have an impact on an
AIDS-related arbitration award. The discussion will focus first on court
interpretations of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and on the
extent to which the Act protects an AIDS-infected employee from adverse
employer action. Next, the discussion will focus on protections state
rehabilitation statutes afford an AIDS-infected employee. Finally, to what
extent does the Americans With Disabilities Act restrict actions based
upon the AIDS infection?
Section 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973P prohibits
discrimination against any "otherwise qualified" handicapped person74
parties and was thus unenforceable.
72. In the former case, the losing party may argue the arbitrator exceeded the parties'
submission by an impermissible incorporation of external law. See supra note 71.
73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-93 (1973).
74. In 1974 Congress expanded the definition of "handicapped individual" for use in
§ 504 to include:
any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of
such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29
U.S.C. § 706(7)(B). As the Supreme Court noted in School Bd. v. Arline,
"The amended definition reflected Congress' concern with protecting the
handicapped against discrimination stemming not only from simple prejudice,
but from "archaic attitudes and laws" and from "the fact that the American
people are simply unfamiliar with and insensitive to the difficulties
confront[ingl individuals with handicaps." S.Rep. No. 93-1297 p. 50 (1974),
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1974, 6400.
School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 279 (1987). The reach of this
amendment was underscored by the Court in Footnote 4:
This subsection includes within the protection of sections 503 and 504 those
persons who do not in fact have the condition which they are perceived as
having, as well as those persons whose mental or physical condition does not
substantially limit their life activities and who thus are not technically within
clause (A) in the new definition.
Members of both of these groups may be subjected to
discrimination on the basis of their being regarded as
handicapped. Id. at 37-39, 63-64; see also 120 CONG. REc.
30531 (1974) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
Id. n.4.
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solely on the basis of that handicap by any employer which receives
federal funds.7s While it is clear that § 504 does protect persons suffering
from contagious disease,76 the protections afforded by § 504 are limited.
A handicapped person is only "otherwise qualified" if he can perform the
essential functions of the job in spite of his handicap.7 Covered
employers and program administrators are required to make a reasonable
75. Section 503 requires employers receiving federal contracts or subcontracts in
excess of $2,500.00 to take affirmative action to employ and advance qualified handicapped
people in employment and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that "[nio otherwise
qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this
title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1987).
76. The Supreme Court spoke directly to this point in School Bd. v. Arline, a case
brought under § 504 involving a teacher with recurrent tuberculosis:
The Act is carefully structured to replace such reflexive reactions to
actual or perceived handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically
sound judgments: the definition of "handicapped individual" is broad, but
only those individuals who are both handicapped and otherwise qualified are
eligible for relief. The fact that some persons who have contagious diseases
may pose a serious health threat to others under certain circumstances does
not justify excluding from the coverage of the Act all persons with actual or
perceived contagious diseases. Such exclusion would mean that those accused
of being contagious would never have the opportunity to have their condition
evaluated in light of medical evidence and a determination made as to
%9,hether they were "otherwise qualified." Rather, they would be vulnerable
to discrimination on the basis of mythology-precisely the type of injury
Congress sought to prevent. We conclude that the fact that a person with a
record of a physical impairment is also contagious does not suffice to remove
that person from coverage under § 504.
School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1987).
77. To decide whether. a given person is "otherwise qualified for" within the meaning
of the Act will require the court to make an individualized inquiry with appropriate findings
of fact. As the Supreme Court noted in School Bd. v. Arline,
such an inquiry is essential if § 504 is to achieve its goal of protecting
handicapped individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or
unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns
of grantees as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety risks.
In the context of the employment of a person handicapped with a contagious
disease, we agree with amicus American Medical Association that this inquiry
should include:
Findings of facts, based on reasonable medical judgments given the. state of
medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is
transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious),
(c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and (d)
the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees
of harm.
Id. at 280.
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accommodation for an employee or applicant." However, reasonable
accommodation does not require the employer to make fundamental
alterations in a job for a disabled employee who cannot perform the tasks
required by the job he was hired to fill.79  In addition, a worker who
poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others in
the workplace will not be "otherwise qualified" if reasonable
accommodation will not eliminate that risk.' Whether the employer can
rely on his own "expert" to resolve the issue remains an open question."'
There has been a great deal of discussion concerning the application
of § 504 to people who are infected with the AIDS virus; most writers are
coming down on the side of coverage.2 While the Supreme Court has not
issued an opinion on this issue,3 the Ninth Circuit has held that AIDS is a
handicap within the meaning of § 504." It is sufficient for the purposes
of this discussion to note that discharges or adverse actions against an
AIDS-infected employee may violate § 504. The parties, as well as the
arbitrator, should recognize that resolution of this issue in a particular
78. In the employment context, an otherwise qualified person is one who can perform
"the essential functions" of the job in question. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985). When a
handicapped person is not able to perform the essential functions of the job, the court must
also consider whether any "reasonable accommodation" by the employer would enable the
handicapped person to perform those functions. Id. at 281.
79. As the Supreme Court noted in School Bd. v. Arline:
Accommodation is not reasonable if it either imposes "undue financial and
administrative burdens" on a grantee, Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, supra, at 412, 99 S. Ct., at 2370, or requires "a .fundamental
alteration in the nature of [thel program" id., at 410. See 45 C.F.R. §
84.12(c) (1985) (listing factors to consider in determining whether
accommodation would cause undue hardship); 45 C.F.R. pt. 84, App. A, p.
315 (1985) ("where reasonable accommodation does not overcome the effects
of a person's handicap, or where reasonable accommodation causes undue
hardship to the employer, failure to hire or promote the handicapped person
will not be considered discrimination"); Davis, supra, at 410-413, 99 S. Ct.,
at 2369-2370; Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S., at 299-301, and n. 19, 105
S.Ct., at 720, and n. 19; Strathie v. Department of Transportation, supra, at
231; Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
Id. at 281 n.17.
80. Id. at 280 n.16.
81. The issue was reserved by the Court in School Board v. Arline: "This case does
not present, and we do not address, the question whether courts should also defer to the
reasonable medical judgments of private physicians on which an employer has relied." Id. at
288 n.18.
82. See infra appendix A for a listing of articles commenting on the application of §
504 to AIDS related employment disputes.
83. The court reserves this issue in School Board v. Arline: "This case does not
present, and we therefore do not reach, the questions whether a carrier of a contagious
disease such as AIDS could be considered to have a physical impairment, or whether such a
person could be considered, solely on the basis of contagiousness, a handicapped person as
defined by the Act." School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 281 n.7
(1987).
84. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, Cent. Dist. of Cal., 832 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir.
1987).
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case will be fact specific. Key elements will be the status of the
employer, the ability of the employee to perform the tasks for which he
was hired, the actual danger to other employees, and the ability of the
employer to accommodate the employee in a way which sufficiently
protects others from disease or injury."
State and local governments have reacted to the AIDS epidemic in a
number of ways. There have been efforts to enact criminal laws
restrictihg behavior which can spread the disease," to amend existing laws
to include testing for AIDS" and to re-examine the state's power to
quarantine its citizens." On the other hand, forty-five states have civil
rights laws which provide protection against discrimination based upon a
handicap. Of these, thirty-three have either specific rulings or informal
indications from state enforcement agencies that people infected with
AIDS are protected from discrimination by state civil rights laws."'
.Several large cities have passed similar protections."'
85. In the case of AIDS, the critical question may NOT be whether the employee can
infect other employees with the HIV virus. The real question may be whether the employee
poses a danger due to an opportunistic infection which IS communicable by casual contact.
Additional questions are posed by the onset of AIDS Related Dementia, the impact of which
may pose the danger of catastrophic loss in some work environments. See generally
Nicholas Hentoff, The Rehabilitation Act's Otherwise Qualified Requirement and the AIDS
Virus: Protecting the Public From AIDS-Related Health and Safety Hazards, 30 ARiz. L.
REV. 571 (1988). See also infra note 124 and accompanying text.
86. See generally Cheney C. Joseph, Jr., Criminal Procedure, 48 LA. L. REV. 257
(1987); Major Eugene R. Milhizer, AIDS Update, 27-50-195 ARMY LAw. 29 (1989); Major
Eugene R. Milhizer, Legality of the 'Safe-Sec' Order to Soldiers Having AIDS, 27-50-192
ARMY LAW. 4 (1988); David Robinson, Jr., AIDS and the Criminal Law: Traditional
Approaches and a New Statutory Proposal, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91 (1985); Marvin E.
Schechter, AIDS: How the Disease is Being Criminalized, 3 CRIM. JUST. 6 (1988); Gene
Schultz, AIDS: Public Health and the Ciminal'Law, VII ST. LOUIS U. Ptd. L. REV. 65
(1988); Barbara Shelley, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Next Step in the Protection of Fetal
Rights?, 92 DICK. L. REV. 691 (1988); Carlton D. Stansbury, Deadly and Dangerous
Weapons and Aids: The Moore Analysis is Likely to be Dangerous, 74 IowA L. REV. 951
(1989); John A. Washington, Preventive Detention: Dangerous Until Proven Innocent, 38
CATH. U.L. REv. 271 (1988); Melissa Wells-Petry, Anatomy of an AIDS Case: Deadly
Disease as an Aspect of Deadly Crime, 27-50-181 ARMY LAw. 17 (1988).
87. See Katherine S. Spaht. Revision of the Law of Marriage: One Baby Step
Forward, 48 LA. L. REv. 1131 (1988) (notes the new requirement for AIDS testing before
marriage).
88. See generally Edward A. Fallone, Preserving the Public Health: A Proposal to
Quarantine Recalcitrant AIDS Carriers, 68 B. U. L. REv. 441 (1988); Larry Gostin, The
Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public Health, and. Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1017 (1989); Deborah J. Merritt. Communicable Disease and Constitutional Law:
Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 739 (1986); Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and
Quarantine: the Revival of an Archaic Doctrine. 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 53 (1985).
89.- EPIDEMIC OF FEAR, A GUIDE TO THE LEGAL PROBLEMS OF PEOPLE WITH AIDS,
(LAMBDA Legal Defense Fund (1990)).
90. A San Francisco ordinance, effective December 20, 1985, prohibits discrimination
based on the fact that a person has or is perceived to have AIDS. This prohibition extends to
employment, housing, public accommodations, educational institutions, and city facilities.
SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ORDINANCE No. 49.985 (Dec. 20, 1985)., reprinted in 3 EMPL.
PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) 20,950B (Dec. 1985). On August 16, 1985, a Los Angeles public
ordinance prohibiting employment discrimination against persons perceived to have AIDS
and persons with AIDS or AIDS-related conditions became effective. LOS ANGELES, CAL.,
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Lastly, the parties ought to consider the provisions of the Americans
With Disability Act of 1990. Though most of its provisions are not
binding until July 1992, the Act will initially cover all private employers
with 25 or more employees.' The sweeping nature of several of its
provisions ensures the Act will exert a major impact on the United States
workplace.
On its face, the basic prohibition of the Act seems simple and not
much broader than that of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973: 92
SEC. 102. DISCRIMINATION.
(a) GENERAL RULE. -- No covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the
disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment."
MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 4, art. 5.8 (1985). Mayor W. Wilson Goode of Philadelphia issued
an Executive Order on April 15, 1986, prohibiting discrimination against persons with AIDS
for the purposes of employment and service. The order was based on new medical
information that AIDS is not communicable by casual contact and on a city solicitor's
opinion that determined AIDS to be a handicap. On December 11, 1986, the City Council
of Austin, Texas passed a broad ordinance banning AIDS discrimination in employment,
housing, and public accommodations. The ordinance extends protection to persons with
AIDS and ARC as well as to individuals who are seropositive or who are perceived to be at
risk of contracting the disease. Jana H. Carey & Megan M. Arthur. The Developing Law of
AIDS in the Workplace, 46 MD. L. REv. 284, 304 n.104 (1987).
91. The Americans With Disability Act provides at Title I, § 101.(5)(A):
(5) EMPLOYER.
(A) IN GENERAL.--The term "employer" means'a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each
working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person, except that, for two
years following the effective date of this title, an employer means a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more employees
for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding year, and any agent of such person.
(B) EXCEPTIONS.--The term "employer" does not include--
(i) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the government
of the United States, or an Indian tribe; or
(ii) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor
organization) that is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 1990).
92. "No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as defined
in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded
from the participation in. be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service." 29
U.S.C. § 794 (a). -
93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 1990).
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The Act uses much the same language as the Vocational Rehabilitation
Act of 1973: protections are extended' to all "qualified individual(sr with
a disability"' as that term is defined by the Act. Concepts such as
"reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship,"9 familiar under the
Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, appear in this new Act as well and
94.
The term "qualified individual with a disability" means an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires. For the purposes of this title, consideration shall be given to the
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an
employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing.
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the
essential functions of the job.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8) (West 1990).
95. "§ 12102(2) DISABILITY.-The term "disability" means, with respect to an
individual-
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment."
42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West 1990).
This language is modified by that of § 12211, which purports to expressly exclude a number
of "conditions" from the expansive definition of disability:
(a) HOMOSEXUALITY AND BISEXUALITY.-For purposes of the
definition of "disability" in section 12102(2), homosexuality and bisexuality
are not impairments and as such are not disabilities under this Act.
(b) CERTAIN CONDITIONS.-Under this Act, the term "disability" shall
not include-
(1) transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism,
gender identity disorders not resulting from physical' impairments, or other
sexual behavior disorders;
(2) compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or
(3) psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal
use of drugs.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12211 (West 1990). However, when these sections are read together, the
statute's definition of disability raises more questions than it answers. What does §
12102(2)(c), as modified, really mean? While the act requires the employee/ applicant to
prove he was discriminated against because he was "regarded" as having an impairment, (as
did the Rehabilitation Act of 1973), how does the "AIDS related" employee/applicant do
this? Assume an applicant is a homosexual who is refused a job on that basis. A claim
under the ADA seems barred by § 12211. What if, despite the express language of §
12211, the applicant sues under the ADA and asserts he was discriminated against not
because he is a homosexual, but because employers (and societ 95. y,) regard all
homosexuals as AIDS carriers. Does he now have a disability claim under § 12102(2)
which can get to the trier of fact? Recognizing the controversy concerning AIDS and the
widespread discrimination against members of high. risk groups, how does the employer
rebut such an assertion? Given the .sociology of AIDS, are the exclusions under § 12211
merely a prescription for litigation?
96. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111-12 (West 1990) for the definitions of these terms under
the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). While these concepts were originally
developed in cases involving the accommodation of religious practices, protections are much
broader under the ADA. For a review of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue
hardship" in the resolution of religious practice grievances, see I. B. Helbum & John R.
Hill, The Arbitration of Religious Practice Grievances, 39 ARB. J. (June 1984, at 3).
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their definitions reflect the parameters that were worked out in litigation
under the older statute.9 However, the term "discriminate" has been
defined in an extremely broad manner and arguably includes people who
have no disability at all.9 As such, the Act could be a source for
argument to a large number of grievants who do not get the answer they
want from the arbitrator.99
VI. EXPECTED DISPUTES AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS UNDER THE Two
MOST COMMON ARBITRATION MODELS
This section will identify the AIDS-related situations that an arbitrator
should expect to encounter and will suggest potential solutions. In an
effort to resist the temptation to "take sides" in a dispute over the
propriety of applying external law in arbitration decisions, this Article will
pose solutions from the point of view of both arbitration models.
Published arbitration decisions concerning AIDS issues are few."', As a
97. Note, however, that reasonable accommodation under the Americans With
Disabilities Act includes "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules and
reassignment to a vacant position," things never required under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9)(B) (West 1990). If a person must have their job
restructured, made part time, or even request re-assignment to function, can the person
really be said to be "otherwise qualified" for the job for which he was hired? At what point
does the "restructured" job become a "new" job; part of a privately funded welfare system
created by the legislature to provide income and benefits for the disabled employee?
98. According to the Act, activities which are "discrimination" include: "excluding
or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known
disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship
or association;" 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(b)(4) (West 1990).
What makes this provision interesting is that it identifies, as discriminatory, acts
against persons who are arguably excluded from the basic protections of § 12112. To come
within the prohibition of that section, a person has to be a "qualified individual with a
disability." Is this just a restatement of § 12102(c)? If it is not, who would fit under this
section and not under the umbrella of § 12102(2)? See supra note 95 for a discussion of §§
12102(2) and 12211.
99. In this context, I intend "source of positive law/public policy" to refer to grounds
for appealing the arbitrator's decision in the courts. However, the Americans With
Disabilities Act could also change the parties' rights and obligations under contracts which
contain incorporation clauses. See supra note 59 for a brief discussion of the various types
of incorporation clauses used in collective bargaining agreements.
100. See Ven E. Hauck, AIDS and Arbitration, 1990 LAB. L. 1. 293. In the only
published article devoted to this topic, Professor Hauck argues that arbitrators "support the
fundamental premise that most AIDS victims can and should continue to work until they are
no longer able to meet reasonable performance standards." Professor Hauck's discussion is
limited to eleven arbitration decisions. Four of these decisions dealt with the discharge of
AIDS victims and seven dealt with disputes premised on employee/employer fears of AIDS.
Unfortunately, Professor Hauck's description of these decisions is somewhat misleading.
For example, in his discussion of Nursing Home v. Union, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 681 (1987)
(Sedwick, Arb.), Professor Hauck informs the reader that the discharge of the AIDS infected
nursing-home worker was overturned. Id. at 279. While this may be so, what Arbitrator
Se'dwick really did was place the employee on suspension until "he no longer had a
communicable disease." Nursing Home v. Union, 88 Lab. Arb. (ENA) 681, 682 (1987).
(Which, absent a sudden and unexpected medical breakthrough, would never occur.) What
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consequence, the discussion will focus on non-AIDS disability decisions
where it is necessary to indicate the positions taken by arbitrators in the
past on such issues.
A. Absenteeism
AIDS, like any other illness, can result in lost production time for
the employer. Traditional sick leave can accommodate the normal
doctor's visits which may be required by the HIV seropositive employee.
However, if that employee progresses to ARC or AIDS itself, the
employer can expect substantial absences as *the employee's symptoms
become more severe.1"' What standards should the arbitrator apply if an
employer discharges an employee due to AIDS-related absences?
Historically, a majority of arbitrators have adhered to the view that
discharge is warranted for chronic, excessive absenteeism even where
such absences are caused by the employee's illness.1'0 This view has
usually been predicated on the contractual implementation of "no fault"
absence provisions which the majority of arbitrators have found to be
"reasonable in principle."'03 Recent decisions have upheld discharges in
absenteeism cases involving industrial injuries," alcoholism,"
the grievant really got was the payment of medical bills which should have been covered
while he was placed on medical leave and the right to purchase medical insurance while on
suspension. An examination of the other discharge cases reveals the arbitrators' decisions
were based upon more traditional "good cause" principles rather than adherence to
Professor Hauck's "fundamental premise." For a more general discussion on AIDS issues in
the workplace see Robert E. Stein, AIDS in the Workplace, Opportunities for Cooperation,
in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, FORTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON
LABOR, (Bruno Stein ed.), 1989, at 12-1; and Robert E. Stein, Strategies for Dealing With
AIDS Disputes In the Workplace, 42 ARB. J. (Sept: 1987, at 21).
101. See supra notes 36-41, and accompanying text.
102. Howard Block & Richard Mittenthal, Arbitration and the Absent Employee, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 37TH ANNUAL MEETING 1984, at 90-91.
103. Id. at 99-101.
104. See T. Marzetti Co. v. Teamsters Local 284, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 154 (1988)
(Sharpe, Arb.), in which Arbitrator Calvin William Sharpe found the Grievant's
excessive-absenteeism discharge, (in which industrial-injury absences accounted for six of
10.5 points that triggered action) did not violate public policy. This decision was reached
despite existence of a state industrial commission resolution which interpreted state law to
require absentee control programs to exclude absences resulting from work-related injuries.
The decision noted the state commission was not authorized to interpret state law, that the
commission resolution would not constitute "legal precedent," and that state courts had not
ruled against such discharges. Id. at 155. See also North River Energy Co. v. United Mine
Workers of Am., Dist. 20, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 447 (1987) (Witney, Arb.), where
Arbitrator Witney upheld the employer's application of the contractual "excessive excused
absences" program to employee who had been continuously off work and collecting worker's
compensation for 15 months following an on-the-job back injury. Factors in the arbitrator's
decision were the opinions of two neurosurgeons who had agreed that employee was fit for
work, the fact that the state had discontinued the grievant's worker's compensation benefits
on the basis of the neurosurgeons' findings, the fact the employee's absences for excused
personal illness during the next two months were six times workplace average, and the
employer's warning to the grievant that he might be placed in the excessive excused absence
program. Id.
239
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depression," tendency to injury, °7 and drug use.t O, However, a failure to
follow proper procedures has resulted in reinstatement in similar cases."
Arbitrators seem to be applying a rough balancing test in absenteeism
cases. On one side are the interests of the ill or injured employee; on the
other, the interests of the employer to have some degree of control over
the number of employees who will be present on any given production
day. In general, if the employee can not come to work with regularity,
then his discharge will be upheld regardless of the reason for the
absenteeism. Although some consideration is given for periods of
105. See Michigan Dep't of Social Servs. v. Michigan State Employees Assoc., 84
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1030 (1985) (Borland, Arb.). Arbitrator Borland upheld the discharge of
an alcoholic who refused to enroll in a hospital in-patient program for treatment and also
refused supervisors' extended efforts to facilitate his treatment. The employee was
discharged despite the fact that there were no performance problems cited on days that he
actually worked. The employer's rational, accepted by the arbitrator was that the
employee's ability to perform in a consistent manner throughout his employment had become
tenuous and sporadic. Id.
106. In Safeway Stores Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Local 175, 94
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 851 (1990) (Staudohar, Arb.), Arbitrator Staudohar upheld the discharge
of an employee whose leave of absence exceeded permissible 18 months. In this case the
employee had stopped working because he was ill with depression. The reports of three
psychiatrists had not given full clearance for return to work. See also Internal Revenue
Service v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 222, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 212 (1985)
(Shieber, Arb.). Arbitrator Shieber sustained the discharge of a grievant whose absence was
due to her "major depressive reaction." Arbitrator Shieber held that the grievant's removal
would enable the agency to fill the position with a dependable employee who is available for
work and thereby contributes to the ability of agency efficiently to accomplish its mission.
Id.
107. In Mead Paper, Chilapaco Mill v. United Paperworkers Int'l, Local 988, 91
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 52 (1988) (Curry, Arb.), Arbitrator Curry upheld the discharge of an
"accident-prone" employee. Arbitrator Curry agreed that the employee was unsuitable for
work in paper mill as he had suffered 10 times more injuries than similarly situated
co-workers, his accident and illness-related absences comprised almost one quarter of his 18
years of employment, and pattern was likely to continue. Id. See also Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Teamsters, Local 100, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 465 (1986) (Chapman, Arb.), in which
Arbitrator Chapman allowed the employer in a discharge action to submit evidence of
excessive workers' compensation claims to justify the discharge based on employee's
overall work record including attendance and injuries." Arbitrator Curry noted that neither
state law nor collective bargaining contract barred such evidence and the employee had
shown no past practice of exclusion by grievance panels at local, state, or regional level.
The arbitrator held that the disputed evidence would permit the grievance panel to determine
whether employee was capable of performing job effectively as any other employee. Id.
108. See Bi-State Dev. Agency v. Amalgamated Transit Union Division 788, 88 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 854 (1987) (Brazil, Arb.).
109. See Pacific Bell v. Communications Workers of America, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
653 (1988) (Kaufman, Arb.). Arbitrator Kaufman reinstated a diabetic employee who had
three periods of disability absence during her five years of employment. Arbitrator Kaufman
decided the employee was discharged improperly under attendance plan which provided that
three or more disability absences within six years were unacceptable. Id. (Employer failed
to investigate fully and consider the "likelihood" of future reliable service and the employer
failed to obtain a current medical opinion concerning whether the grievant's diabetes was
under control.) See also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Teamsters Local 503, 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
270 (1987) (Kapsch, Arb.). Arbitrator Kapsch vacated the excessive absenteeism motivated
discharge for six months on condition that the grievant, (who had good record over 26 years
except for absences due to acute depression and treatment) continue medical treatment and
accept re-employment to his former position or any other position he was otherwise qualified
to perform.
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absenteeism which are due to work related injury, even those cases result
in discharge when the employee fails to "recover" in a reasonable time.'
For the arbitrator who is restricted to the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement, there is no need to apply a different standard in
cases where the reason for "excessive" absenteeism is an AIDS-related
illness. The arbitrator should treat the AIDS-related absence as he would
any absence arising under the collective bargaining agreement. Under a
"no-fault" absenteeism policy, the AIDS sufferer is no better or worse off
than any other ill or injured employee. Given the progressive nature of
the disease, discharge in the case of an AIDS patient is inevitable. In this
respect, the plight of the AIDS-infected employee is most analogous to
that of employees stricken with degenerative diseases such as multiple
sclerosis, severe rheumatoid arthritis, diabetes, or emphysema.
For the arbitrator who believes incorporation of external law is
required, the decision is less clear. As discussed above,' the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, state and local "disability" statutes, and the
Americans With Disabilities Act contain provisions which may restrict the
discharge of an employee who begins to experience AIDS-related
absences. The arbitrator who seeks to follow external law, either to
insulate the decision from reversal on public policy grounds or to "save
the parties" from future litigation, should conduct an inquiry into the
precise nature of the absences and whether "reasonable accommodation"
would result in their technical cessation. If accommodation would
eliminate absences, a prudent view of the law suggests the employee
should be retained.'
As a practical matter the infected employee's absences will continue.
What will change is their characterization under the collective bargaining
agreement. With "reasonable accommodation" (either job restructuring or
the institution of a flexible schedule) the impact of the absences on the
employer's operation will be lessened and the final day of reckoning
postponed." 2
B. Refusal to Work (Health and Safety)
Employees who feel their working conditions pose an unreasonable
risk of harm may have the right under federal law to refuse to perform
110. See North River Energy Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 20, 88 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 447 (1987) (vitney, Arb.).
111. See supra notes 73-98 and accompanying text.
112. See K. Dow Scott & G. Stephen Taylor, An Analysis of Absenteeism Cases
Taken to Arbitration: 1975-1981, 38 ARB. J. (Sept. 1983, at 64, 68).
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that work.1 3 However, the employee must, in good faith, reasonably
believe the task assigned poses a real danger of death or serious injury
otherwise the "disobedience" is unprotected. 4 Employees who refuse to
work under such circumstances bear the burden of showing, by
"ascertainable, objective evidence," that conditions exist which justify the
refusal to work. 5  A review of reported arbitral decisions since 1945
indicates this is a difficult burden indeed. In the majority of cases
involving refusals to work for reasons of health and safety from 1945
through 1985, the employees' grievances were denied by the arbitrator.'
6
In cases involving disease and disability from 1945 through 1985, the
grievances were denied in over ninety-percent of the cases."
7
Given the controversy surrounding the AIDS epidemic,' it is not
surprising that there have been instances where employees have filed
grievances in connection with tasks which they believe put them at risk of
infection.' 9  However, the reported cases indicate that establishing the
113. This "right" can be derived from two sources: the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 and § 502 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 143. Robert C. Lombar, AIDS in the Workplace: Selected Legal Issues,
350 PRAc. L. INST. 103 (1988).
114. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
establishes two employer duties: A specific duty under § 654(a)(2) to comply with all
occupational safety and health standards promulgated by the government; and a general duty
under 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (the "general duty clause") to furnish employment and a place
of employment "free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm." Employees who in good faith reasonably believe the task assigned
poses a real danger of death or serious injury may, after first seeking correction of the
health hazard from the employer, refuse to subject themselves to the risk. Under these
circumstances, OSHA prohibits an employer from taking any adverse action against such an
employee. Gombar, supra note 113. For a review of arbitration standards in OSHA related
grievances see Beth A. Wolfson, Arbitration and OSHA, 38 ARB. J. (Sept. 1983, at 12).
115. Section 502 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 143, which
permits employees acting in good faith to refuse to work under "abnormally dangerous
conditions." In order to be protected for a work refusal predicated on § 502 of the LMRA
however, the employees must be able to demonstrate by "ascertainable, objective evidence"
that they were or were about to be exposed to "abnormally dangerous conditions." Gateway
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
116. James A. Gross & Patricia A. Greenfield, Arbitral Value Judgements in Health
and Safety Disputes, Management Rights Over Workers' Rights, 34 BUFF. L. REv. 645 app.,
at 689 (1985).
117. Id. See also Terry L. Leap, Er AL., Health and Job Safety: An Analysis of
Arbitration Decisions, 41 ARB. J. (Sept. 1986. at 41), (devoted primarily to health related
job safety issues).
118. See supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
119. See State of Delaware, Dep't of Corrections v. AFSCME, L-1726 Council 81
Delaware Public Employees, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 849 (1986) (Gill, Arb.). Arbitrator Gill
found the employer had violated a contract provision requiring notification to union and
prison guards of inmates who had, or were "medically suspected" of having communicable
disease when it refused to disclose names of inmates who had tested "positive" for AIDS.
This decision reflected an accommodation to the fears of employees rather than any finding
that the asymptomatic tested prisoners posed a real danger to bargaining unit members. See
State of Minnesota, Dep't of Corrections v. American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, Council 6, 85 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1185 (1985) (Gallagher, Arb.), in
which Arbitrator Gallagher reinstated a guard who had refused to obey an order to conduct
pat search of inmates because of fear of AIDS contamination. The arbitrator found the
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"reasonable belief" that the task poses real danger of death or serious
injury is no easier in the AIDS context than it has been generally. The
decisions of arbitrators in these few reported AIDS cases reflects their
insistence, in keeping with the standards noted above, that the grievant
make a showing of objective proof that AIDS is generally communicable
by the kinds of casual conduct which occur in the workplace." Given the
current position of medical authorities,' and the apparent deference of the
courts to that position,m it is difficult to imagine how an employee in the
discharge overly harsh given the atmosphere of panic created in part by the warden's
pronouncements and the failure to provide AIDS education which might have dispelled the
employee's "unreasonable" apprehension. See Veterans Administration Medical Center v.
American Federation of Gov't Employees, Local 2547, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 169 (1990)
(Murphy, Arb.). Arbitrator Murphy denied demands by night maintenance employees (who
cleaned federal medical-center room in which AIDS-causing human immunodeficiency virus
was kept and HIV research was conducted) for environmental differential pay allowed by
federal regulations for duties involving either "high degree hazard," (eight-percent
differential) or "low degree hazard" (four-percent). The arbitrator noted that the work was
not performed "with or in close proximity to micro-organisms" so as to involve "potential
personal injury," or "potential for personal injury." Id.
120. If an employee does contract disease in the workplace, the employer may find
himself liable. However, most state worker's compensation statutes exclude disease
unrelated to the employee's particular occupation. Under these circumstances the employer
whose worker contracts AIDS on the job may be liable under traditional tort law with its
more generous compensation levels. On the other hand, the employee's predisposition or
vulnerability may be a defense. In Anderson v. General Motors Corp., 442 A.2d 1359
(Del. 1982), the Industrial Accident Board denied a claim for occupational disease benefits.
The state Supreme Court held that claimant failed to establish by substantial competent
evidence that his ailment, allergic rhinitis, resulted from the peculiar nature of his
employment at automobile assembly facility rather than from his own peculiar predisposition.
Id. In Esposito v. N.Y.S. Willowbrook State School, 38 A.D.2d 985, 329 N.Y.S.2d 355
(1972), the state Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that award for disability resulting
from occupational disease could not be sustained where claimant, who allegedly contracted
hepatitis while employed as food service worker at state school for mentally retarded, was
employed at school for only a day and a half, there was no proof that claimant came in
contact with a particular patient or patients suffering from infectious hepatitis and bnly
competent evidence that any patient was suffering from disease was hospital director's letter
stating that such disease was endemic at school. In McCarthy v. State Dep't of Social and
Health Services, 730 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1986). an employee who alleged that her employment
required her to work in office environment in which she was regularly exposed to tobacco
smoke and that as a result of her exposure to tobacco smoke she developed obstructive lung
disease leading to her terminating her employment stated claim for negligence if employee's
disease was not occupational disease within exclusive coverage of Industrial Insurance Act.
However, exclusive remedy provisions of Industrial Insurance Act generally bar private
causes of action only when particular disease is within coverage provisions of Act.
121. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
122. In its discussion of the implementation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
Supreme Court noted:
such a[n] [medicall inquiry is essential if § 504 is to achieve its goal of
protecting handicapped individuals from -deprivations based on prejudice,
stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to such
legitimate concerns of grantees as avoiding exposing others to significant
health and safety risks . . . . In the context of the employment of a person
handicapped with a contagious disease, we agree with amicus American
Medical Association that this inquiry should include: "[Findings of] facts,
based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical knowledge,
(emphasis added) about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is
transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier infectious),
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average workplace" 3 could justify a refusal to work with an HIV positive
co-worker based on a fear of HIV infection.
Fellow employees could assert that the continued employment of an
AIDS-infected worker presents a "real danger of death or serious injury"
due to the presence of his opportunistic infections and not necessarily the
AIDS virus itself. Unlike the HIV virus, it could be argued that these
infections may be transmitted by casual contact.17 However, this
approach adds nothing to the debate. The arbitrator who follows the
traditional principles discussed above should not confront novel issues. If
an AIDS-infected employee can be shown to present a real danger to the
workplace, either because of the danger of AIDS transmission or the
danger of opportunistic infection, then a grievance by a co-worker should
be sustained. If the fear of danger is based upon misconception or can be
removed by reasonable accommodation instituted by the employer, then
the gievance should be denied. While the consideration of opportunistic
infections might change the focus of the factual inquiry, it does not
change the analysis. In these cases, where the refusal to work will be
based upon federal law, the parties can be expected to invite the arbitrator
to consider the applicable federal law in his decision. Consequently, a
discussion of decisions under the two arbitral models is unnecessary.
C., Discharge (Health and Safety)
Although a seropositive employee's normal workplace activities are
unlikely to result in the spread of the HIV infection to others,,2 the
impact of the disease as it progresses in an infected individual can raise
safety issues for the employer. The most troublesome of these issues, as
it relates to the individual worker, is the unforeseeable impact of ARC.
(c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and (d)
the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees
of harm."
School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987).
123. See supra note 2 (concerning workplaces characterized by exposure to blood or
other bodily fluids).
124. Opportunistic microorganisms (which may be bacteria, fungi, parasites, or
viruses) may cause infections exclusively in "compromised hosts" (for example, certain
species of Bacillus), or may cause infections more frequently or more severely in
compromised than in "normal" hosts. Alexander V. Graevenitz, OPPORTUNISTIC INFECTION,
in 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (6th ed. 1987).
125. This discussion necessarily excludes the unique problems posed by the health-
care environment. However, even there the analysis should be the same: (a) Does the
employee's condition present a threat to his co-workers or to clients? (b) Can the threat be
eliminated by steps short of discharge? (c) Do the steps necessary to eliminate the threat
constitute an unreasonable burden on the workplace? Given the invasive procedures
conducted by health care providers, there is a very real danger of worker and client
infection. See infra appendix B for a list of articles which address this issue.
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As noted above, the symptoms of ARC can range from minor
forgetfulness to severe dementia and psychomotor retardation.126  The
uncertain development of undiagnosed but potentially progressive mental
defects has led some to argue that even asymptomatic individuals who are
seropositive for the HIV virus should be banned from certain professions
in the interests of public safety.w  This concern for safety would
theoretically support similar restrictions in non-public, but inherently
dangerous, occupations where even mild cognitive disorders might pose a
risk of serious injury. However, despite the general concern, there is also
scientific authority for the contrary view: asymptomatic individuals who
are seropositive for the HIV virus will not suffer from mental disturbances
before suffering from AIDS itself. s
Given the conflicting nature of the scientific evidence, the arbitrator
should treat a discharge for suspected or anticipated AIDS related
dementia in the same way he would treat any other discharge or adverse
action involving allegations of mental disease. Traditionally, whether the
arbitrator confines himself to the four corners of the contract, (using some
version of "just cause" as his standard,) or incorporates external law, the
arbitrator's analysis has been centered on the actual condition of the
126. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
127.
There is thus a well documented medical likelihood that large numbers
of those infected with the AIDS virus are subject to central nervous system
dysfunction, that the cause of the dysfunction is difficult to detect and often
misdiagnosed until it reaches a more serious stage, and that this dysfunction
can occur in asymptomatic carriers of the virus entirely independent of any
damage to the immune system associated with a diagnosis of AIDS. These
findings have an impact on a wide range of employees infected with the AIDS
virus who may not be "otherwise qualified" because of therisk [sic] that they
will sustain damage to their central nervous system resulting in varying forms
of mental deficiency and brain dysfunction that might place others in danger
and prevent them from performing the "essential functions" of their jobs.
The employees that such a risk would most immediately impact are
those whose jobs entail significant responsibility for the safety of others: bus
drivers, airline pilots, air traffic controllers, police officers, elevator and fire
inspectors, as well as a host of other jobs where an employee's mental
deficiency or brain dysfunction could threaten the safety of others. There are
many other jobs, which require complex abstracting ability or rapid
information processing, where the asymptomatic carrier of the AIDS virus
would not be otherwise qualified for employment under the "business
necessity and safe performance" defense provided by the Department of
Labor's regulations interpreting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Nicholas Hentoff, The Rehabilitation Act's Otherwise Qualified Requirement and the AIDS
Virus:'Protecting the Public from AIDS-Related Health and Safety Hazards, 30 ARIZ. L.
REv. 571, 621 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
128. THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, STATEMENT ON NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL
ASPECTS OF HIV INFECTION (March 13, 1988), quoted in Hentoff, supra note 127 at 618
n.248.
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grievant.'9 "Evidence" consisting solely of unsupported generalizations,
made without consideration of the particular condition of the grievant, has
been rejected in favor of more particularized proof. If an employer can
establish that the grievant is suffering from a mental defect which prevents
job performance, and that reasonable accommodation will not permit the
employee to perform that job, then the discharge should be sustained. A
failure of proof as to the grievant dictates reinstatement.'
There is no reason this mode of analysis should not apply in an AIDS
case in the same manner as it does in any other case involving allegations
of mental defect. Those who call for presumptive disqualification of HIV
positive employees implicitly argue that the HIV-free employee is, by
definition, free from physical or mental imbalances. However, no one
would argue that the employer who ignores such deterioration in any
employee does so at the employee's own peril. If the employer detects
forgetfulness, emotional or physical disturbances, or any other "odd"
behavior, that behavior should be investigated. Whether the employer
determines the unacceptable behavior is due to clinical depression, drug
abuse, alcoholism, physical disease or transitory personal problems, the
traditional arbitration standard in a discharge case remains how such
behavior detracts from the worker's ability to do the job. There seems to
be no good reason to forge a new standard for workers who are HIV
positive.
129. For example, consider Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist. v. Int'l Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, Local 1245, AFL-CIO, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1073 (1988)
(Concepcion, Arb.), where the discharge of a building maintenance sub-foreman was upheld.
The employee exhibited erratic behavior, wild mood shifts and used prescription tranquilizer
drugs chronically. Id. at 1074. A psychiatrist diagnosed grievant as "manic depressive with
immature personal features" and concluded that his emotional instability "would preclude
him from his work at the nuclear power plant." Id. Oddly, the union in this case presented
no countervailing expert opinion despite the fact that the diagnosis would prevent grievant
from obtaining necessary security clearance. Id. at 1075. For a case showing reinstatement,
see East Ohio Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Workers Union, Local 555, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 366
(1988) (Dworkin, Arb.). Arbitrator Dworkin held the non-disciplinary discharge of
employee who could not perform regular duties because of acute anxiety depression was
arbitrary. Id. The employer had discharged the grievant based on medical evidence two
months old and expert witness testified that anxiety-depression patients often respond quickly
to treatment. Id. Significantly, this decision was not made under a "just cause" standard
but under the more difficult (for the employee,) standard of "reasonable or arbitrary" action
under contractual management-rights clause. Id.
130. The use of generalizations or "group guilt" unrelated to the particular grievant
has been rejected as inherently unfair in the discipline area. Marvin Hill, Jr. & Diana Beck,
Some Thoughts on Just Cause and Group Discipline, 41 ARB. J. (June 1986, at 59). The
same philosophical rationale would seem to apply in the cases involving AIDS related
discharges based solely on attenuated medical generalizations.
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D. Discharge (Inability to Perform)
What standard should the arbitrator apply if the employer discharges
an HIV-positive employee who the employer alleges is no longer able to
perform the job for which he was hired? In a published arbitration
decision directly on point, Arbitrator Sid Braufman described the
standard:
Whether the grievant suffers from some form of AIDS or from some
other disease or illness, should be immaterial so far as his
employment status is concerned. What is really crucial, in my view,
is whether or not, despite his health problem, the grievant is truly
capable of doing his job. If he is, then he should be permitted to
return to work promptly provided of course, that such return poses
no additional health threat either to the grievant or to his
co-workers."'
Arbitrator Braufman directed that the discharge be converted to an
involuntary, unpaid medical leave of absence and ordered the parties to
have the grievant examined by a physician who specialized in AIDS.
Arbitrator Braufman further ordered the parties to inform the selected
AIDS specialist of the regular duties of the grievant's position so he could
certify whether the grievant was fit to perform the full range of those
duties without jeopardizing himself or his co-workers. Arbitrator
Braufman further noted that
[i]f the specialist finds and certifies, however, that the grievant is not
fit to perform the full range of his duties, then the grievant shall
continue on involuntary medical or disability leave, subject to the
terms and conditions of the pertinent provisions of the labor
agreement and/or the customary practice of the parties.,'
The standard enunciated by Arbitrator Braufman faithfully tracks the
standard used by other arbitrators in non-AIDS related discharge cages.
Employers who wish to discharge or take other adverse action against an
employee m bear the burden of establishing that the employee cannot
131. In re The Bucklers, Inc. v. Local 517-S, Prod. Serv. and Sales Dist. Council,
AFL-CIO, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 937, 939 (1987) (Braufman, Arb.).
132. Id. at 939.
133. For similar analysis in a reassignment case, see Hamilton County Sheriff v.
Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Consultant, Inc., 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1012 (1988)
(Loeb, Arb.). In this case,-an exemplary seven-year road-patrol officer with medically
controlled seizure disorder was reassigned to clerk duties following on-duty seizure. Id.
Arbitrator Loeb rejected as "arbitrary" a county demand for a medical guarantee against
future seizures. Id. Key factors were the county's knowledge of disorder at time of hire,
the fact that the officer's condition had not deteriorated during employment, and, most
importantly, the fact that three physicians, including one chosen by county, determined the
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perform the job for which he was hired.'4 Arbitrators require the
employer to establish the grievant's disability through recent medical
examinations which in turn consider the requirements of the grievant's
job.13s
Will recourse to external law result in a different decision than that
rendered by a arbitrator who confines himself to the four corners of the
collective bargaining agreement? In this area the answer may be yes. As
noted above, both the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the recently passed
Americans With Disabilities Act require an employer to make "reasonable
accommodation" for the grievant's disability. 36  What constitutes
reasonable accommodation will be determined by a factual inquiry in each
case. However, it is at least clear from the cases that the employer is not
required to assign the employee to a new job or fundamentally change the
work process to design a job the grievant can do. 37  An arbitrator who
incorporates -federal law may require an employer to take specific steps
before a discharge will be upheld,'3 ' even though such steps were not
required under the strict language of the collective bargaining agreement.
grievant was medically fit to perform all patrol-officer duties. Id.
134. See City of Ithaca v. CSEA, 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 747 (1990) (Miller. Arb.).
Arbitrator Miller found the city sanitation department improperly discharged garbage
collector who had 50-pound lifting restriction, despite contention that it had fulfilled duty to
accommodate grievant by assigning him temporarily to recycling job until disability was
determined to be permanent. Arbitrator Miller rejected the city's position that permanent
assignment to the recycling job would mean creation of a new position, specifically finding
that the garbage collection and recycling jobs were intermingled. Id. As grievant was
qualified and able to perform all functions of the related (substantially equivalent) recycling
job, his discharge was improper. Id. See also East Ohio Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Workers
Union, Local 555, 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 366 (1988) (Dworkin, Arb.).
135. See supra note 109.
136. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Lamott v. Apple Valley Health Care Center, Inc., 465 N.W.2d 585
(Minn. App. 1991) (Nursing Home failed to reasonably accommodate victim of cerebral
hemorrhage when it assigned her to new duties with which she was unfamiliar and gave her
no guidance.); Coffman v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 386 S.E.2d I (W.Va. 1988) (a decision
under the West Virginia human rights statute where the court held the law did not require
the employer to assign a custodian to different job he could perform); Rancour v. Detroit
Edison Co., 388 N.W.2d 336 (Mich. App. 1986) (a decision under Michigan handicap law
holding the employer is not required to place an injured employee who cannot perform
original job into new job).
138. See Department of Health and Human Servs., Social Security Admin. v.
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1395, 87 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1026 (1986) (Wolff.
Arb.). Arbitrator Wolff held the agency improperly discharged an employee for poor
performance several months after he returned to work from approved absence for
hospitalization and treatment of alcoholism. Critical to the arbitrator's decision was the
employer's failure to conduct a formal evaluation, including the "fitness for duty"
examination required by law and contract, to determine whether employee's continued under-
performance was attributable to alcoholism, to anxiety and depression-producing "white
knuckle sobriety" experienced by some recovering alcoholics, or to some other health
problem. Id. Also noted was the agency's obligation, under the law, regulation and other
mandates to act as a 'model employer' (29 C.F.R. 1613.703 (1978)) and to make
reasonable accommodations to the grievant's disease and handicap (29 C.F.R. 1613.704
(1978)). Id. Failure to do so constituted prohibited discrimination. Id.
POST-PANIC PERIOD
Whether a decision under the "four comers" model will be reversed
as a violation of state or federal handicap statutes will depend entirely
upon whether the collective bargaining agreement is interpreted in a
manner that is consistent with the principles embodied in such statutes.
Even if the precise statutory language is absent from the collective
bargaining agreement, "reasonable accommodation" as described by
federal and state law could be reached by an arbitrator using a traditional
interpretation of the "just cause" provision contained in that agreement.
Such an interpretation would insulate the, arbitrator's decision from
reversal on public policy grounds while elininating the need to expressly
invoke external law. However, unless the arbitrator's use of the statutory
standard is purely accidental, then this "discovery" of the proper
interpretation of the just cause provision seems to be merely a thinly
disguised incorporation of external law. If an arbitrator must take this
approach to produce an enforceable solution in this regulated environment,
then does he have an affirmative duty to tell the parties that they have a
contractual problem which they must address. at the bargaining table?
The Americans With Disabilities Act's focus on individual rights and.
its enforcement mechanisms mirror those of Title VII. If awards which
violate- a grievant's rights face almost certain reversal on public policy
grounds, will this new, pervasive regulation force traditionalists within the
arbitration community to specifically incorporate external law when
dealing with AIDS and other disability related grievances? Again, the
short answer seems to be no. First, the basic standards in the new law
have been part of many workplaces for almost two decades under the
terms of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Secondly, the new
Act's restrictions will take time to absorb. Consequently, there is no
reason to believe that they will not ultimately become part of the "law of
the shop" in much the same way as EEO restrictions and principles have
during the past two decades. To the extent that parties wish to ensure
subsequent awards embody these principals, -they are free to do so when
they draft their collective bargaining agreement or set the limits of their
arbitrator's jurisdiction.
Under either model, the fact that the grievant suffers from AIDS
versus another disability does not appear to trigger additional factors to
consider in reaching a decision. Therefore, the arbitrator should decide
these cases by reference to the traditional principles, which developed in
the context of other disability related discharges.
E. Testing
Concerns about AIDS have prompted some employers to implement
testing programs under the management .rights provisions of their
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collective bargaining agreements.s" The justification for the imposition of
such testing policies is generally a rough identification of the nature of
AIDS (i.e., a communicable disease), coupled .with the consequences of
infection which invariably result in death. As noted above, this analysis
ignores the overwhelming opinion of the worldwide scientific community
regarding the nature of the threat of infection due to casual contact.'4
Arbitrators faced with discharges resulting from employee refusals to
comply with employer demands for medical testing have applied a rather
simple test. If the employer cannot articulate a rational reason for the
original demand which brings it within the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement, then the employee is reinstated.1 4' Employer
demands for AIDS testing would clearly be subject to this same traditional
standard.
Unless the employer can establish a legitimate, work-related reason to
test his employees, the imposition of such a program, as well as the
discharge of employees who refuse to comply, should be overturned.
Given the scientific facts concerning AIDS, it is unclear what that work-
related reason could be in the average work place.'4 In the typical case,
adherence to traditional standards would dictate reinstatement for the
employee who was discharged for refusing to take an AIDS test.
139. See J. Sterling Morton High School v. Morton Council Teachers Union, Local
571, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 521 (1987) (Whitney, Arb.). Arbitrator Witney held the School
Board's adoption of testing policy permitting school board to require employees whom it
reasonably suspects of having "highly contagious disease" to be examined by
board-appointed physician and/ or to take sick or health leave violated the collective
bargaining contract and Illinois law. Id. The arbitrator specifically found the policy was
enacted solely in response to the AIDS epidemic and was based on the "unsupported
assumption" that AIDS is highly contagious and represents a "clear and present danger"
within the school setting. Id.
140. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
141. See Laclede Gas Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l, Local 5-6, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 398
(1987) (Mikrut, Arb.). Arbitrator Mikrut reinstated an employee who refused to retake a
drug test after he had tested positive for marijuana, where he had completed employee
assistance program and was subject to random drug-screening pursuant to company
procedure for qualifying truck drivers under federal regulations. Just cause did not exist to
discharge employee where the employer's procedure did not address discipline for refusal to
take test. Id. See also Gulf Atlantic Distrib. Serv. v. Local 315, Retail Stove Union, 88
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 475 (1986) (Williams, Arb.). Arbitrator Williams found that just cause
did not exist for "insubordination" discharge of employee who refused to submit to physical
examination ordered after two polygraph tests, to which employee had voluntarily submitted
in employer's investigation of missing merchandise, allegedly showed marked physiological
changes. Key factors for the arbitrator were the fact the order was not directly related to the
grievant's job, that there was no substantial evidence that employee might have injurious
disease or that he was incapable of performing job without endangering himself and/or
others. Id.
142. While there seems little justification for AIDS related testing in the normal work
environment, there may be justification for such testing in some settings. See infra appendix
B for a list of articles which discuss the need for AIDS related information in the health care
environment.
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F. Refusal to Promote
What should an arbitrator do in a case where the grievant has been
denied a promotion based upon his AIDS-related condition? Assume an
"HIV positive grievant has been denied advancement on the basis of the
HIV condition. The hypothetical employer asserts that the position
applied for requires extensive training and would place the grievant in
charge of long term projects. The employer does not wish to "waste" the
training on a, presumptively terminal employee and wants to select an
applicant who will "be around" to supervise the conclusion of his or her
long-term commitments. The employer may argue that due to the HIV
infection, the grievant is an extremely poor risk on both counts. What
then should be the arbitrator's decision?
First, the arbitrator should determine whether the HIV positive
grievant is physically capable of performing the duties of the desired
position now. In the case of a seropositive but asymptomatic grieVant the
answer should be yes. If the grievant's condition has progressed to ARC
or if the grievant is suffering from "full blown" AIDS, then the answer
may be no. There is no new "AIDS" analysis needed at this stage. An
employer should be required to list the physical requirements of the job
(i.e., place, time, and duty) and establish why the grievant cannot fulfill
those requirements. If the grievant cannot at ihat time perform the duties
even with *reasonable accommodation, then the arbitrator should resolve
the grievance in the employer's favor.
The employer's objections, however, are related to suppositions
concerning the grievant's expected future capabilities and not his present
performance. The question confronting an arbitrator is whether to uphold
an adverse action based on such employer predictions. In most cases the
answer should be no.
As noted above,"* there is currently no way to predict how long it
will take a seropositive grievant to develop ARC or AIDS, or even
whether he will develop those conditions. Such an employee is no more
"likely" to die in the foreseeable future than any other employee. A
grievant who has developed ARC will experience minor health problems,
but may not develop AIDS. There is simply no way to predict~the course
of the ARC grievant's condition or whether the ailments associated with
ARC will materially interfere with his ability to. perform the job in
question. Given the facts espoused by medical authorities, the
hypothetical employer's belief in the grievant's impending demise does not
appear- to be particularly well founded.
The average arbitrator would not sustain refusal by an employer to
143. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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promote men after they reach fifty because they have an increased risk of
heart attack. Nor would most arbitrators permit employers to discriminate
against married women of child-bearing age simply because they could
potentially become pregnant. The same sort of analysis should be applied
in most AIDS cases. The arbitrator should look to the employer for proof
that the grievant will not be able to fulfill the requirements of the job.
Absent such proof, the grievant should prevail.'"
The discussion above may not apply to people who have developed
"full-blown" AIDS. People with "full-blown" symptoms of AIDS often
experience bouts of extreme illness and accordingly would probably
require considerable accommodation from their employers to perform
normal duties. Because the life expectancy of an AIDS-infected person is
between eighteen months to two years, the employer's decision to exclude
such a person from a lengthy or demanding training program could be
justified. The analysis, however, is unchanged. The arbitrator should
still require the employer to present sufficient medical evidence to
establish the grievant should be excluded from consideration for promotion
or training. In the cases of a grievant suffering from "full blown" AIDS,
the evidence indicates such decisions may very well go to the employer.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the political and social undercurrents which continue to
characterize discussions of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, an
examination of the facts now available suggests that these should not be
difficult cases for arbitrators. Certainly the social issues discussed are as
relevant to the arbitrator faced with an AIDS-related controversy as they
are to the parties whose perceptions of these issues will ultimately shape a
dispute. However, the arbitrator who desires to reach a decision based
upon the facts rather than the conflicting fears of the parties needs to
come to the hearing with a clear understanding of the real issues.
There is no evidence Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome can be
transmitted by casual contact. This renders the infection of an employee
factually irrelevant to others with whom he has such contact. Under the
144. See Hamilton County Sheriff v. Fraternal Order of Police, 90 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
1012 (1988) (Loeb, Arb.). Arbitrator Loeb found the employer had improperly reassigned a
police officer to clerk duties after medical treatment related to his epilepsy. (The employer
had ignored medical evidence that the grievant's condition was medically controlled and had
demanded a "guarantee" against future seizures.) For comparison, see the decisions in the
following cases where adverse employment actions involving "disabled" applicants were
found to violate state discrimination laws: Dairy Equip. Co. v. Wisc. Dep't of Indus., Labor
and Human Relations, 15 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 8052 (1977) (only one functioning kidney);
Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Dep't of Indus., Labor and Human Relations, 14 F.E.P. Cases
344 (1976) (acute lymphocytic leukemia in remission).
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circumstances, the traditional principles applied by arbitrators in cases
involving less emotionally charged physical disabilities can and should be
applied by arbitrators in cases involving AIDS.
Arbitrators should recognize that there are both federal and state laws
which' restrict employer discretion in the hiring and firing of persons
classified as "disabled." Infectious diseases such as AIDS have been
found to constitute disabilities under those laws. An arbitration decision
which concerns a discharge or other adverse action against an HIV-"
infected employee will likely fall within the parameters of these'
restrictions.
An arbitrator who follows the traditional "four corners" model, needs
to recognize that decisions involving AIDS-related disputes, like all
decisions involving disabilities, are issued within an increasingly regulated
environment. These laws expand the possibility of later courtroom
challenges on public policy grounds. Under the circumstances, parties
seeking to avoid further litigation ought to consider requesting the
incorporation of external discrimination law, even if their only reason for
doing so would be to make it clear that the principles embodied in such
laws were honored.
The arbitrator who regularly incorporates external law in his decisions
should become familiar with the state and federal statutes which will
govern the dispute if it moves from arbitration to trial courts. A clear
enunciation of the factors and standards established by those laws should
insure that all AIDS-related arbitration decisions result in an enforceable
award which reflects an accurate view of the facts.
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